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I.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
On June 12, 2000, a unanimous Supreme Court quietly rendered what will almost 
certainly become a landmark decision in healthcare law relative to the interpretation 
and application of fiduciary duties in an Employer Sponsored Benefit Plan 
[hereinafter “ESBP”] as regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 [hereinafter “ERISA” or the “Act”].2  In Pegram v. Herdrich3 the Court 
rejected patient Herdrich’s claim that a cost containment plan whereby annual 
payments were made to physicians rose to the level of imposing a fiduciary duty on 
an HMO pursuant to ERISA.4  Such a duty would require the providing company to 
manage the ESBP funds in accordance with the statute and traditional common law 
principles.5  Carle Company, a large Health Maintenance Organization, maintained a 
policy of making annual kickback payments to physicians who cordoned costs at a 
                                                                
1Professor of Business Law, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC.  S.J.D. (Candidate) 
(Health Law and Policy), Loyola University Chicago; LL.M. (Taxation), 1992, Georgetown 
University; J.D., 1981, Tulane University; M.P.A., M.S., 1974, B.A., 1973, Syracuse 
University; (e-mail:  karnsj@mail.ecu.edu).  
229 U.S.C. § 1144a (1988). 
3Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
4Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 832 (1974), as amended by 
Act of 1994, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1109(a) (1994). 
5The fiduciary section of the ERISA statute provides: 
[a]ny person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the 
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter 
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting 
from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which 
have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject 
to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including 
removal of such fiduciary. 
§ 1109(a). 
2 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 15:1 
pre-determined level.6  The corporation’s rationale was that the payments were an 
incentive to keep costs down, the very essence of the HMO industry.7 
Plaintiff Herdrich had been treated by Doctor Pegram who failed to make a 
referral to a specialist despite patient complaints of severe abdominal pains.  
Medication was prescribed and the patient sent home.8  Eventually, Herdrich 
suffered a ruptured appendix along with the typical resulting complications.9  She 
sued Carle Company under the theory that the kickback payments violated the ESBP 
clause of the ERISA statute in that the company stood as a fiduciary of the funds 
over which it presided.10  Specifically, Section 1109(a) of ERISA provides that: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of 
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this 
subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses 
to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan 
any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets 
of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or 
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of 
such fiduciary.11 
The monies in question had been collected from the employer and the worker, 
and as such, Herdrich claimed that Carle Company had a higher duty to insure their 
protection and proper use.12  She also filed a negligence malpractice claim against the 
individual physician, Dr. Pegram.  That suit eventually resulted in a jury verdict in 
favor of Herdrich with monetary damages.13  Carle Company, on the other hand 
adamantly stood by its position that the ESBP did not impose any fiduciary 
obligation relative to its handling of employee health care plan premiums.14  The 
issue as to whether ERISA preempted the claim against the company was not the 
focal point of the Circuit level dispute regardless of its growing importance amongst 
members of the managed care industry to keep states and class litigants from 
initiating any type of legal action comparable to that seen recently in the tobacco 
cases.15 
                                                                
6Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218-19. 
7Id. at 219. 
8Id. at 216. 
9Id. 
10Id. at 217. 
1129 U.S.C. § 1109(a); see also Pegram, 530 U.S. at 217. 
1229 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
13See generally Penny Pinching OK, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2000, at 40. 
14See generally Pegram, 530 U.S. 211. 
15Id. at 220.  The Court stated that Congress did not anticipate that the ERISA fiduciary 
provision would open the federal courthouse doors for unheard of fiduciary litigation.  Id. 
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Previous to the issuance of the Court’s opinion in June 2000, the author prepared 
an article based on the Seventh Circuit's opinion holding in favor of Herdrich.16  That 
article agreed in every respect that the managed care industry is insufficiently 
controlled in this country, or in the alternative, is controlling health care costs at the 
expense of one patient at a time.17  More specifically, arguments were made 
supporting the Seventh Circuit’s decision as to the fiduciary application of ERISA 
against the Carle Company.18  Although accepted for publication prior to the 
Supreme Court’s opinion hand-down date, the article was not available for 
circulation until subsequent to June 2000.19 
Accordingly, this Article is a rebuttal to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pegram 
v. Herdrich on the strength of two primary arguments.  First, the Seventh Circuit’s 
rationale was on-point and extremely sound in concluding that HMOs do stand as 
trustees as envisioned by the ESBP and cannot offer kickback payments to 
physicians simply to increase shareholder wealth at the expense of patient health and 
                                                                
16Jack E. Karns, Litigating Around ERISA to Quality Managed Healthcare:  An HMO Can 
Breach Fiduciary Duties, 79 NEB. L. REV. 149 (2000). 
17Id. at 153-55. 
18Id. at 169-70. 
19The article was published in September 2000, several months after the unanimous 
decision in Pegram.  The speed with which the Court dispensed with this case, a total of four 
months, inevitably emboldened the rationed care industry and its legal spokespersons: 
The federal government’s General Accounting Office found that every 1% increase in 
health care insurance premiums causes 300,000 to 400,000 people to lose coverage.  
There is no free lunch:  Either premiums are higher, and fewer people secure 
coverage, or premiums are lower and less money is spent on health care costs.  The 
inevitable effect of these lawsuits, if successful, would be to make only Cadillac care 
available, but solely to those who can afford Cadillacs.   
Daniel E. Troy, HMO Ruling Makes Sense, NAT’L L. J., July 3, 2000, at A18. 
The efficacy of the argument set forth by Mr. Troy begins with a questioning of federal 
governmental agency pronouncements.  Mr. Troy can choose to believe whatever he wants, 
especially since he represents well-heeled HMO clients, but the problem with healthcare 
delivery in the United States has a venerable and not so glorious past that must be appreciated 
and then dismantled.  As long as the American Medical Association [hereinafter “AMA”] was 
a major player in the manner in which physicians were educated and permitted to provide 
services, our system became too heavily skewed toward specialists.  The AMA’s role in the 
current debacle can be compared to the free-wheeling corporate takeover days of the 1980’s 
when a corporate board made the company vulnerable to takeover by extravagant decision-
making.  What resulted was a flurry of activities that were an affront to anything resembling 
an honest “business” transaction.  Michael Milken, junk bonds, paper numbers, and no 
tangible value.  The real unfortunate part was that it was “just business” with no 
comprehension that the business cycle envisions making or producing services or goods, not 
paper profits.  What finally brought all this chaos to an end was the crash of the market, the 
demise of junk bonds, the incarceration of a select few (not nearly enough) individuals and a 
realization that the entire decade had been a charade of greed and waste. 
We are now engaged in an equivalent struggle within the healthcare industry as private 
firms encroach on what was once the sole domain of tax exempt organizations and the 
practicing profession.  It is regrettable that the AMA and its constituent members did not see 
this attack forming, but that is understandable since they were too busy guarding private 
preserves to monitor the state of medical trust in this country.  They now reap the whirlwind.  
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welfare.20  This was a textbook example of breach of fiduciary duty given the 
medical trust relationship between physician and patient.21  Had the HMO offered a 
hedge fund option using securities from firms other than itself, there is no question 
that the fiduciary issue would have been much more difficult for Herdrich to 
establish.22  But by offering cash incentive payments, Carle Company wedged the 
interest of shareholder wealth maximization between that of physician performance 
and patient health needs.23  This created a natural fiduciary tension that cannot be 
explained away by Justice Souter’s comment that, “[t]he pleadings must also be 
parsed very carefully to understand why acts by physician owners acting on Carle’s 
behalf are alleged to be fiduciary in nature.”24  All such decisions are fiduciary in 
nature.25 
Secondly, even though the courts did not deal with the preemption issue, Pegram 
opens the door for the industry to next claim complete preemption from state 
regulation via ERISA's provisions.26  The managed care industry cannot have it both 
ways.  If the ESBP does not apply to HMOs then neither does the preemption 
provision of the retirement Act.27  This would then allow state attorneys general to 
provide at least minimal protection to residents by regulating managed care 
                                                                
20North Carolina House Bill 1537 was passed on June 30, 2000, just ten days after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Pegram.  The legislative healthcare package was ultimately 
ratified by both houses of the legislature as Senate Bill 199.  This occurred on October 17, 
2001, becoming Session Law 2001-446 following signature by the governor. 
21Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 369-70 (7th Cir 1990).  
22WILLIAM F. SHARPE & GORDON J. ALEXANDER, INVESTMENTS, 553, 619-20 (1996).  
Hedging allows a reduction in sensitivity to the price of options by allowing a position that 
offsets the value of the investment held.  Another investment is purchased that has an opposite 
price change.  When a derivative can be purchased that is interest rate sensitive, an upward or 
downward movement in interest rates is thwarted.  There is no question good hedging 
positions are difficult to formulate, however, the benefits are geometric.   
The application to the HMO in a case such as Pegram would permit the company to have 
the providing physician participate in the “market” rather than in the rationing of healthcare.  
In effect, by making decisions not to make diagnostic or specialist referrals, the providing 
physician engages in the same type of risk taking that hedging entails.  The difference is that 
“market hedging” does not involve possible malpractice, federal preemption or ERISA 
statutory claims.  It just involves more work by the HMO to establish the process by which the 
physician is made a participant in the hedge pool. 
23Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 375-76. 
24Pegram, 530 U.S. 227. 
25Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 377.  The Seventh Circuit stated: 
We must remember that doctors, not insurance executives, are qualified experts in 
determining what is the best course of treatment and therapy for their patients.  
Trained physicians, and them alone, should be allowed to make care-related decisions 
with, of course, input from the patient.  Medical care should not be subject to the 
whim of the new layer of insurance bureaucracy now dictating the most basic, as well 
as the important, medical policies and procedures from the boardroom. 
Id. 
26Id. at 378. 
27Id.  
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organizations via state consumer protection statutes.28  These are sometimes referred 
to as “Little FTC Acts,” and could be utilized in conjunction with other specific 
legislation aimed at curbing abuses in this business.29  For example, North Carolina’s 
new “Patient Bill of Rights” provides for external review of HMO procedures.30  It 
also prescribes prompt payment of claims and utilization review.31  Predictably, 
supporters of the Pegram decision see managed care organizations as recipients of 
everything on their wish lists, and then some, by implying too much from Justice 
Souter’s opinion: 
This ruling may not formally end the many class actions filed against 
HMOs across the country since October [1999].  But the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that the very nature of an HMO involves cost controls reveals 
these lawsuits for what they are (but claim not to be) – broad based 
assaults on the concept of managed care.  The court's decision also shows 
that the insured are unlikely to benefit if these suits prove successful.  
Instead, they are likely to encounter higher premiums, less access to 
health care and health insurance, detailed judicial oversight of health care 
delivery and massive attorney fees.  
. . . 
Yet the HMO class actions attack virtually every incentive and practice 
managed care entities employ to try to curb medical costs.  Accordingly, 
as Justice Souter implicitly recognized, these suits, if successful, would 
preclude HMOs. 
.  .  . 
Justice Souter’s commonsense approach undercuts the theory of the class 
actions.  ‘The Federal Judiciary would be acting contrary to the 
congressional policy of allowing HMO organizations if it were to 
entertain lawsuits that ‘portend wholesale attacks on existing HMOs 
solely because of their structure.’  The court thus confirmed what 
everyone already knew:  Managed care necessarily entails financial 
incentives to control runaway medical inflation.32 
Finally, the clarity of the Court’s position relative to the straightforward question 
of whether an employer sponsored health plan falls under the purview of ERISA’s 
fiduciary provision is no longer in issue.33  However, the significant question is how 
the decision will affect state efforts to regulate managed care without running afoul 
of any federal preemption standards established by Pegram, implied or expressed?  
                                                                
28Id. at 366 n.2 (Herdrich included in Count II of the Complaint an assertion that the 
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act had been violated due to failure to disclose material information). 
29Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 366 n.2. 
30N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-50-75–95 (2001). 
31§ 58-50-30. 
32Troy, supra note 19, at 4.  
33See generally Penny Pinching OK, supra note 13, at 40.  
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This is particularly troublesome since the next obvious step for the managed health 
care industry would be to argue that this case settles all issues regarding both 
fiduciary and federal preemption of state regulation.34  Pegram did not directly 
address the preemption question, but the industry could easily look to a corollary 
situation for support. 
In 1992, airline carriers argued that the Texas Attorney General [hereinafter 
“AG”] did not have the authority to impose advertising regulations given the 
preemption of any such efforts as set forth in § 1305(a)(1) of the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1988 [hereinafter “ADA of 1988”].35  Specifically, the airlines 
pointed to language in the section that the federal government had the authority to 
regulate “any law, rule, regulation, standard, or any other standard having the force 
and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.”36  In Morales 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,37 the Texas AG sought to impose section 2.5 of Air 
Travel Industry Enforcement Guidelines [hereinafter “Guidelines”], a document 
which had been adopted by the National Association of Attorneys General 
[hereinafter “NAAG”].38  The key issue in this case concerned the manner in which 
airlines advertised the component parts of total air fares, while § 2.5 of the 
aforementioned Guidelines related to the handling of surcharges and stated that 
“[a]ny fuel, tax, or other surcharge to a fare must be included in the total advertised 
price of the fare.”39  The airlines had engaged in the process of “unbundling” fares 
such that surcharges were not included in the large print prices but were, instead, 
listed in fine print at the bottom of the advertisement.40  Texas, along with six other 
signatory states, sent a memorandum and copy of the Guidelines to the major airline 
carriers indicating that failure to heed § 2.5 and that the standing practice of 
“unbundling” fare prices were violations of the Guidelines.41  Perhaps more 
importantly, the signatories added that the actions constituted a clear “violation of 
our respective state laws on deceptive advertising and trade practices.”42 
Trans World responded by arguing that the ADA of 1988, as well as the Federal 
Aviation Act, preempted any such efforts by the states.43  The Court had dealt with 
this same issue relative to ERISA, and it is these case decisions that the managed 
care industry is likely to argue are appropriate precedent in regulating HMOs as 
                                                                
34See Steven K. Sanborn, Supreme Court Clarifies ERISA Fiduciary Liability for HMOs 
but Muddies the Water on ERISA Preemption, CAMPBELL L. OBSERVER, Summer 2000, at 4, 9. 
3549 U.S.C. § 1305 (1988).   
36§ 1305a-(1). 
37504 U.S. 374 (1992).  
38Id. at 379 (NAAG is an organization actively engaged in establishing uniform standards 
for consumer protection pursuant to state consumer protection statutes).    
39Id. at 405.  
40Id.  
41Id. at 379.  
42Morales, 504 U.S. at 379. 
43Id. at 380.  
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well.44  This presents some particular problems for those who support the Seventh 
Circuit’s original decision in Pegram, as well as the likely arguments that will be 
forthcoming that the Court’s reversal means in practical terms that a decision was 
also rendered that ERISA’s preemption provision precludes any state regulation of 
managed health plans whatsoever.  In effect, supporters of the Pegram decision 
argue that it settled both the fiduciary and preemption issues together, albeit the latter 
in an implied fashion.45  The result will be one that only a Congressional solution 
will resolve given the impasse that currently exists with regard to insuring that 
corporate health care providers are held accountable, or at least held to a due 
diligence standard.46  It is this latter point that produces the most consternation 
relative to the fallout of Pegram.47  This Article will explore the actual fiduciary-
related holding of Pegram and the controversy surrounding the Supreme Court's use 
of the term “mixed eligibility” decisions in deciding whether an HMO is a 
fiduciary.48  Prior to this discussion the conflicting opinions issued by the Seventh 
                                                                
44ERISA preempts state law to the extent that it “relate[s] to any employee benefit plan.”  
29 U.S.C. § 1144a (1988).  The Supreme Court has recognized this particular language to have 
a “broad scope,” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985), a 
“broad sweep,” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987), is “broadly worded,” 
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990), is “broadly worded” Pilot Life 
Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 46, and is “conspicuous for its breadth,” FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 
U.S. 52, 58 (1990). 
45See generally Troy, supra note 19. 
46Even Justice Souter agrees that the resolution of this issue resides with Congress.  
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 233-34.  
47See Marc I. Machiz, Hidden Blow to HMOs, NAT’L L. J., July 3, 2000, at A19. 
48Pegram, 530 U.S. at 227-28.  The Court noted and then explained its distinction between 
“eligibility” versus “treatment” decisions made by HMO physicians: 
The pleadings must also be parsed very carefully to understand what acts by physician 
owners acting on Carle’s behalf are alleged to be fiduciary in nature. . . .  What we 
will call pure “eligibility decisions” turn on the plan's coverage of a particular 
condition or medical procedure for its treatment.  “Treatment decisions,” by contrast, 
are choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patent’s [sic] condition: 
given a patient’s constellation of symptoms, what is the appropriate medical response?  
These decisions are often practically inextricable from one another . . . . 
 
This is so not merely because, under a scheme like Carle’s, treatment and eligibility 
decisions are made by the same person, the treating physician.  It is so because a great 
many and possibly most coverage questions are not simple yes-or-no questions, like 
whether appendicitis is a covered condition (when there is no dispute that a patient has 
appendicitis), or whether acupuncture is a covered procedure for pain relief (when the 
claim of pain is unchallenged).  The more common coverage question is a when-and-
how question.  Although coverage for many conditions will be clear and various 
treatment options will be indisputably compensable, physicians still must decide what 
to do in particular cases. . . .    
Id.  (footnotes and citations omitted). 
At this point, Justice Souter delivered what would become the foundation for excusing 
Carle for its providing physician’s―Dr. Pegram―liability for mixed eligibility versus 
treatment decisions: 
In practical terms, these eligibility decisions cannot be untangled from physicians’ 
judgments about reasonable medical treatment, and in the case before us, Dr. Pegram’s 
8 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 15:1 
Circuit and the Supreme Court will be examined as a prelude to a set piece 
discussion of the fiduciary duty issue. 
II.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN HERDRICH V. PEGRAM 
Cynthia Herdrich was covered by a health insurance program owned by 
physicians and operated as Carle Company, an HMO.49  This plan was provided by 
her husband’s employer, State Farm Insurance, which had a contract with the HMO 
to cover its employees.50  In 1992 she sought treatment from Pegram, a participating 
physician, for an inflamed abdomen.51  The physician did not make a referral to a 
specialist, but rather, sent her home with medicinal treatments.52  Eight days later the 
patient's appendix burst causing her to contract peritonitis.53  An interesting and 
important aspect of the contract between the HMO and participating physicians was 
that annual kickback payments would be made if medical costs, especially referral 
costs, were kept to specified minimums.54  Obviously, Carle Company referred to 
these payments as “cost containment” payments or “year-end bonuses” and argued 
that they were the very essence of what an HMO was established to do, keep 
healthcare costs low if not under control.55  This particular aspect of the contract 
would be a particularly contentious one as the case made its way through the 
appellate process.56 
                                                          
decision was one of that sort.  She decided (wrongly, as it turned out) that Herdrich’s 
condition did not warrant immediate action; the consequence of that medical 
determination was that Carle would not cover immediate care, whereas it would have 
done so if Dr. Pegram had made the proper diagnosis and judgment to treat.  The 
eligibility decision and the treatment decision were inextricably mixed, as they are in 
countless medical administrative decisions every day. 
Id. 
The tragedy of the Court’s comments is that no allowance for the patient is provided in the 
case where care is withheld in such fashion that a full diagnosis has been disguised sufficient 
to claim a lack of negligence, yet still be able to benefit from the HMO’s annual kickback 
scheme.  To overlook this as a distinct possibility within the medical field is to disregard a 
fundamental understanding that not all physicians can be relied upon for superior treatment.  
Some are in it for the money and will sacrifice patient well-being for personal pecuniary gain, 
as long as they feel civil and criminal culpability cannot be proven.  
49Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 365. 
50Id.  State Farm was an Illinois corporation at the time the plan was in effect.  Id. 
51Id.  
52Id.  
53Herdrich 154 F.3d at 365 n.1.   
54Id. at 371-72.  Herdrich argued that because the company had the exclusive right to 
determine all “disputed and non-routine claims” the firm was a fiduciary.  Id. at 371.  Judge 
Coffey did not debate this conclusion:  “We can reasonably infer that Carle and HAMP were 
plan fiduciaries due to their discretionary authority in deciding disputed claims.”  Id.  See also 
Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 
1995).  
55Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 372.   
56Id.  In a very simple paragraph the Court set forth the self-serving nature of the kickback 
payments received by plan physicians to withhold critical care for personal pecuniary gain: 
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Herdrich sued both Doctor Pegram and Carle Company in state court alleging 
fraud on the part of the HMO and negligence on the part of the physician.57  While 
Carle Company filed a motion to remove the case to federal court which was 
granted, Herdrich won a jury verdict in the amount of $35,000 as to Doctor Pegram 
on the negligence claim.58  The HMO refused to settle; in federal district court the 
HMO argued that ERISA preempted the fraud claims and was successful in having 
one of the fraud counts dismissed via summary judgment.59  However, plaintiff 
Herdrich was given leave to amend the remaining fraud count which she did by 
artfully including the argument that the healthcare plan fell under ERISA’s fiduciary 
rules since the physicians made decisions in the provision of medical services that 
were directly in their self interest.60 
                                                          
The Plan dictated that the very same HMO administrators vested with the authority to 
determine whether health care claims would be paid, and the type, nature, and duration 
of care to be given, were those physicians who became eligible to receive year-end 
bonuses as a result of cost-savings.  Because the physician/administrator's year-end 
bonuses were based on the difference between total plan costs (i.e., the costs of 
providing medical services) and revenues (i.e., payments by plan beneficiaries), an 
incentive existed for them to limit treatment and, in turn, HMO costs so as to ensure 
larger bonuses.  With a jaundiced eye focused firmly on year-end bonuses, it is not 
unrealistic to assume that the doctors rendering care under the Plan were swayed to be 
most frugal when exercising their discretionary authority to the detriment of their 
membership. 
Id. 
It is difficult to see how Justice Souter could conveniently “parse” the pleadings this way 
as to overlook such a blatant “self-dealing” being perpetrated by Dr. Pegram.  Pegram, 530 
U.S. at 226.  First, she examined Herdrich on March 1, 1991, and according to the Court, 
“acknowledged that she (Herdrich) was experiencing pain in the midline area of her groin.”  
Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 365 n.1.  Six days later, March 7, Dr. Pegram discovered an inflamed 
mass in the patient’s abdomen.  Id.  Pegram then required the patient to suffer an additional 
eight days before she would accede to an ultrasound treatment.  Id.  Of course, that latter 
treatment had to be administered at a Carle Company facility fifty miles distant simply to save 
costs.  Id.  Altogether, Dr. Pegram required the patient to unnecessarily suffer fifteen days and 
face a company edict that she travel to an HMO owned facility for further treatment before her 
appendix ruptured.  Id.  This is not a medical condition generally considered to be minor in 
nature, and the unmitigated complication rests with Carle Company’s callous disregard of 
patient pain and suffering at the expense of profit and care rationing.  Then the company chose 
to reward this conduct by plan participants, if not require it at the risk of individual physician 
deselection, and hid behind the ERISA liability shield.  The foregoing is the first illustration 
that the Supreme Court improperly overlooked critical Circuit Court rationale and conclusions 
that render suspect its four month leap to justice.   
Judge Coffey cast a “jaundiced eye” toward the kickback arrangement vis a vis the 
fiduciary question while Justice Souter did not similarly view the arrangement.  This is hardly 
the “commonsense approach” advocated by Mr. Daniel E. Troy in his observations of the final 
Court ruling.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
57Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 365. 
58See Penny Pinching OK, supra note 13, at 40.  
59Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 365.  
60Id.  
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Stated differently, by keeping medical costs down and refusing expensive 
referrals, the physicians received larger annual kickback payments.  This created a 
personal incentive that rendered any decision to underprescribe treatment and 
procedures to be of direct pecuniary interest to plan participants.61  Assuming 
arguendo, the correctness of plaintiff’s position, this would make Carle Company a 
fiduciary of the monies, both employer and employee contributed, used to fund the 
healthcare program and the HMO’s liability for violating ERISA’s fiduciary 
standards.62  The Seventh Circuit’s affirmation of the district court's decision 
established the landscape for an epic healthcare legal battle that is likely to have 
repercussions for years.63 
The amended complaint was quite explicit regarding this heretofore unseen 
application of ERISA.64  Bolstering the argument was the fact that if ERISA was 
determined to be applicable in this case, then the legislative history of the Act was 
very much in play.65  Plaintiff most likely would have preferred to argue the 
preemption issue on other grounds, but given the Supreme Court's track record for 
applying ERISA in a “very broad” manner the situation dictated a novel approach to 
the question.66  Accordingly, if Carle Company chose to protect itself under the 
ERISA umbrella, plaintiff should at least be heard on the broadest of applications as 
far as the statute was concerned.67  This meant that Carle Company was portrayed as 
                                                                
61Id. at 372.  
62Id. at 372-73.  
63Id. at 379-80.  
64Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 366-67.  
65Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231-32.  The United States Supreme Court in its reversal of the 
Seventh Circuit relied heavily on the assumption that Congress did not intend to include 
HMOs within the reach of ERISA: 
Based on our understanding of the matters just discussed, we think Congress did not 
intend Carle or any other HMO to be treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it makes 
mixed eligibility decisions acting through its physicians. . . .  Indeed, when Congress 
took up the subject of fiduciary responsibility under ERISA, it concentrated on 
fiduciaries’ financial decisions, focusing on pension plans, the difficulty many retirees 
faced in getting the payments they expected, and the financial mismanagement that 
had too often deprived employees of their benefits. . . .  Its focus was far from the 
subject of Herdrich’s claim.  Our doubt that Congress intended the category of 
fiduciary administrative functions to encompass that would follow from Herdrich’s 
contrary view. 
Id. citing S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 5 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 17, 95 (1973). 
The irony of the position taken by the Supreme Court rests with the fact that a health 
benefit plan has all the comparable aspects of a pension plan, and employees view the two as 
critical benefits in any job selection process.  Further, even if Congress passed ERISA to focus 
mainly on pensions, the provisions of the statute are written broadly and nothing cited by the 
Court as legislative history would have precluded a contrary decision. 
66Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439-43 (1999) (holding that ERISA’s 
Exclusive Benefit Rule does not preclude the conferral of benefits by a plan sponsor on others, 
the sponsors may promote business interests unrelated to the pension plan, and sponsors may 
enhance existing plan benefits for current employees). 
67Id. 
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a significant trustee-like player and the healthcare plan was clearly an employer 
sponsored benefit plan that triggered ERISA’s fiduciary responsibilities.68  The 
crucible was the kickback payment scheme set in alignment with a healthcare plan 
where plan participants made self serving treatment decisions. 
From a policy perspective, after ruling that the fiduciary rules of ERISA applied, 
the Seventh Circuit looked at the critical issue of duty breach.69  The Circuit Court, 
Judge John L. Coffey presiding, was not led astray by Carle Company's extended 
effort to obfuscate the kickback scheme as it applied to the fiduciary issue in a smoke 
cloud of weak issues and arguments.70  Judge Coffey believed that Carle Company’s 
kickback payment arrangement cast a grave shadow over the entire healthcare 
program raising questions in the minds of patients as to whose interests were first 
and foremost on the minds of the participating physicians.71  Although not stated 
specifically in the opinion, the issue of medical trust has become a major concern as 
HMOs increase in number and total patient coverage.  Yet, the managed care firms 
hold the trump cards as they can enter a market and self-determine just how 
aggressively to pursue market objectives.  The result for covered patients is no or 
limited choices in medical care providers at the individual practitioner and hospital 
levels, since the HMOs can choose to qualify participants at both levels. 
As to the breach of duty question the Seventh Circuit took all of the foregoing 
into consideration in rendering its opinion that Herdrich’s claim merited 
consideration by a trial court.72  The circuit court also considered the overall effect 
                                                                
68Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 371.  
69Id. at 372-73.  
70Id. at 376.  Judge Coffey noted the interplay of the kickback scheme used by Carle 
Company and the flat fee or “capitation” payment system used by many HMOs: 
In order to minimize health care costs and fatten corporate profits for HMOs, primary 
care physicians face severe restrictions on referrals and diagnostic tests, and at the 
same time, must contend with ever-shrinking incomes.  Sixty percent of all managed-
care plans, including HMOs and preferred-provider organizations, now pay their 
primary-care doctors through some sort of ‘capitation’ system, according to the 
Physician Payment Review Commission in Washington, D.C.  That is, rather than 
simply pay any bill presented to them by your doctor, most HMOs pay their 
physicians a set amount every month--a fee for including you among their patients. 
Id. 
Judge Coffey continues with some payment examples.  The Chicago GIA Primary Care 
Network pays $8.43 monthly for every male patient and $10.09 for every female patient.  Id.  
He also cites the “withhold” system as yet another mechanism for rationing primary provider 
care.  Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 376.  Under this latter system “a percentage of the doctor’s 
monthly fees are withheld and then reimbursed if they keep their referral rates low enough.”  
Id.  
71Id.  In referring this “bottom line mentality,” the business aspect of managed care is now 
indicated by what is referred to as the “medical-loss ratio,” or the proportion of total revenues 
that have to actually be paid for patient care.  Id.  “The Association of Medical Colleges 
reported last November that medical-loss ratios of for-profit HMOs paying a flat fee to doctors 
for treatment averaged only 70% of their premium revenue.  The remaining 30% went for 
administrative expenses--and profit.”  Id.   
72Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 380.  
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on the plan corpus73 in light of the carefully crafted fiduciary argument so as to 
minimize the scope of the overall claim and the preemption issue.74  This goal was 
achieved and is evidenced by the statement in the opinion that Herdrich alleged a 
fundamental and unconscionable overstepping that “springs from the authority of 
physician/owners of Carle to simultaneously control the care of their patients and 
reap the profits generated by the HMO through the limited use of tests and 
referrals.”75  With this pronouncement the stage was set for Carle Company's 
expenditure of significant corporate resources to seek review by the highest court 
and for a disappointing result from the perspective of patients trapped by similarly 
situated HMO plans.76 
III.  SUPREME COURT REVERSAL 
The Supreme Court acted swiftly on this case by hearing oral argument in 
February and issuing its unanimous decision on June 12, 2000.77  Justice Souter 
wrote for the Court and summed the salient issue as follows:  “The question in this 
case is whether decisions made by a health maintenance organization, acting through 
its physician employees, are fiduciary acts within the meaning of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). . . .  We hold that they are not.”78  
Following a recitation of the facts in Pegram, Justice Souter turned briefly to “some 
background of fact and law about HMO organizations, medical benefit plans, 
fiduciary obligation, and the meaning of Herdrich’s allegations.”79  Prior to the 
1960’s, fee-for-service was the accepted method for receiving medical assistance in 
this country.80  A physician could establish set prices for defined procedures such as 
a physical exam or vaccination with the patient receiving a bill for payment.81  The 
physician might have been willing during this period to file the claim with the 
patient’s insurance company, or as was more often the case, the individual had to do 
it himself.82 
In this fee-for-service system the check and balance as to the provision of 
medical services was the trust obligation between doctor and patient that reasonable 
skill and diligence would be exercised despite the fact that there was a definite 
                                                                
73Id.  (“On the surface, it does not appear to us that it was in the interest of plan 
participants for the defendants to deplete the Plan’s funds by way of year-end bonus 
payouts.”). 
74Id. at 366.  Herdrich had received judicial leave to amend Count III of the Complaint 
which provided the basis for moving forward on the ERISA claim.  Id.  
75Id. at 373. 
76Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 372-73. 
77Pegram, 530 U.S. at 214. 
78Id. at 218. 
79Id. 
80Id. 
81Id. 
82Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218. 
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incentive to provide excess care.83  Perhaps more importantly, patients were free to 
choose their preferred physician and could rely on a variety of factors in doing so, a 
choice allowance not necessarily afforded with the introduction of HMOs.  Starting 
in the 1960’s new models for providing medical services sprouted up as non-
medically trained individuals got involved with alternative healthcare delivery 
systems.  HMOs were the logical outgrowth of this evolution and had as their 
defining feature one set fee for each patient enrolled in the program with the services 
to be provided established in a contract, typically with the employer.84  Assumption 
of financial costs in excess of premiums paid were absorbed by the HMO which 
resulted in steps that any risk bearing organization would take.85  Certain procedures 
would be permitted, or covered, while others were excluded.86 
It was also typical for the company to issue a general set of guidelines to be 
followed in the decision making process regarding additional medical procedures.87  
Requested services were scrutinized to insure that they fell well within the guidelines 
of covered procedures, and participating physicians were often provided financial 
incentives for keeping total general medical costs, as well as specialist referrals, to a 
minimum.88  With the HMO the physician's personal pecuniary interest rested with 
providing less care, the patient protected only by the provider’s professional 
obligation and medical trust.89  After all, the reason that HMOs began to displace 
fee-for-service providers was that excessive and unnecessary services were being 
requested.90  This natural tension resulted in the type of situation posed by the 
Pegram case since the provider received the type of annual payment discussed 
above.91  Further, Doctor Pegram decided to wait before referring her patient for an 
ultrasound, and she insisted that Herdrich travel a long distance to have this 
procedure done at a facility owned by Carle Company, another cost cutting move 
dictated by the HMO.92  Health care observers and commentators can easily argue 
that this is a clear violation of the medical trust and the professional obligation owed 
to a patient in immediate need of specialist care, constituting a complete disregard 
for the individual’s needs in favor of self interest and HMO bottom lines.93 
The Supreme Court then discussed the bona fides of annual incentive payments 
to providers concluding that they were the essence of any healthcare delivery system 
                                                                
83Id. 
84Id.  This payment system is often referred to as capitation. 
85Id. at 219. 
86Id.  
87Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219.  
88Id. 
89Id. 
90Id.  
91Id. at 220. 
92Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215. 
93Id.  
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designed with cost control in mind.94  The Court stated that it was not suggesting 
“that the Carle provisions are as socially desirable as some other HMO 
organizational schemes; they may not be. . . .  But whatever the HMO, there must be 
rationing and inducement to ration.”95  No court could determine whether the 
decision-making of an HMO was good or bad in a particular case with additional 
information not likely to be readily accessible, such as correlation between 
malpractice rates and HMO models or fee-for-service programs.96  In summation on 
this point, the Court quoted case precedent:  “Congress is far, better equipped than 
the judiciary to ‘amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data’ bearing upon an issue 
as complex and dynamic as that presented here.”97  The conclusion was that “courts 
are not in a position to derive a sound legal principle to differentiate an HMO like 
Carle from other HMOs.”98 
Plaintiff Herdrich’s fiduciary claims were next addressed in the context as 
applied via ERISA.  The statute requires that to be a fiduciary an individual must be 
acting as a manager or financial advisor to a “plan.”99  The complaint alleged that 
Carle had breached its fiduciary duty by failing to properly execute its duties as to 
the health care plan.100  ERISA includes a rather convoluted definition of the term 
“plan,” or “circular” as the Court put it.101  As to the term “fiduciary,” Carle is not a 
fiduciary under ERISA “merely because it administers or exercises discretionary 
authority over its own HMO business, it may still be a fiduciary if it administers the 
plan.”102 
Applying the common law of trusts necessitates a different approach, and does 
not adequately cover the healthcare issues presented in Pegram.103  The most critical 
duty owed by a common law fiduciary is that of loyalty to the interests of the 
beneficiary(ies) with no self interest or third party promotion.104  The Court referred 
to Meinhard v. Salmon105 where Justice Cardozo stated: 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting 
at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee 
is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.  Not 
                                                                
94Id. 
95Id. at 221. 
96Id. 
97Pegram, 530 U.S. at 221 (quoting Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 
U.S. 305, 331 n.12 (1985)). 
98Id. at 222.  
99Id. 
100Id. 
101Id. 
102Pegram, 530 U.S. at 222. 
103Id. at 224. 
104Id. 
105164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
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honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the 
standard of behavior.106 
Beyond the initial requirement of “responsibility” owed to the beneficiary, 
fiduciaries under ERISA and the common law part ways markedly.107 
A common law fiduciary only acts in this capacity when he or she takes direct 
action that impacts on the beneficiary.108  Typically, he owes no additional 
responsibilities in any other capacity to the beneficiary.109  On the other hand, an 
ERISA fiduciary may at one moment be the manager of a healthcare plan benefiting 
employees, and then take on additional employer responsibilities owed to the 
beneficiary or where interaction with the beneficiary is required.110  In either case, 
there is absolutely no connection with his duties as the healthcare plan fiduciary.111  
Looking at the Herdrich complaint, the Court stated that: 
In every case charging breach of ERISA fiduciary duty, then the threshold 
question is not whether the actions of some person employed to provide 
services under a plan adversely affected a plan beneficiary’s interest, but 
whether that person was acting as a fiduciary (that is, was performing a 
fiduciary function) when taking the action subject to the complaint.112   
More simply stated, Herdrich’s complaint did not sufficiently detail a breach of the 
ERISA fiduciary duty relative to Carle’s cost containment program adequate to 
maintain a cause of action under the statute.113 
The Court analyzed the plaintiff’s claims as meaning that once Carle, as fiduciary 
administrator, was immediately “subject to such influence from the year-end payout 
provision that its fiduciary capacity was necessarily compromised, and its readiness 
to act amounted to anticipatory breach of fiduciary obligation.”114  This is the point at 
which the Court made clear its direct opposition to the fiduciary duty argument as 
framed in this case.115  The Court insisted that the pleadings be read carefully to 
determine exactly what actions by the physician owners could be construed as 
fiduciary in nature when undertaken on Carle’s behalf.116  At this point issues of 
“eligibility” were segregated from those regarding “treatment.”117  The former 
                                                                
106Id. quoted in Pegram, 530 U.S. at 224-25. 
107Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225. 
108Id.  
109Id.  
110Id.  
111Id.  
112Pegram, 530 U.S. at 226. 
113Id.  
114Id. at 227. 
115Id.  
116Id. at 227-28. 
117Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228. 
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decisions are those that go to the extent which the health plan provides coverage to a 
particular health problem or malady or the “medical procedure for its treatment.”118  
In contrast, a treatment decision revolved around choices as to how to diagnose and 
treat a patient’s medical condition.119  This latter point is an extremely important one 
from the perspective of the Court and Carle Company as they both argue that the 
failure to refer or pursue a more vigorous plan of treatment is not, in and of itself, a 
breach of ERISA’s fiduciary duty.120  But then, the Court made clear just how critical 
it was to “parse” the pleadings in order to render the appropriate decision.121 
In a case like the one involving Herdrich, both eligibility and treatment decisions 
are rendered by the same individual with no recourse to a second opinion or double 
check method.122  The Supreme Court dismisses this argument since most coverage 
questions are simple yes or no questions: 
Although coverage for many conditions will be clear and various 
treatment options will be indisputably compensable, physicians still must 
decide what to do in particular cases.  The issue may be, say, whether one 
treatment option is so superior to another under the circumstances, and 
needed so promptly, that a decision to proceed with it would meet the 
medical necessity requirement that conditions the HMO’s obligation to 
provide or pay for that particular procedure at that time in that case.123 
Dr. Pegram faced this type of decision and made an incorrect choice, as even the 
highest Court acknowledged.124  This resulted in the patient’s eligibility and 
treatment decisions becoming “inextricably mixed, as they are in countless medical 
administrative decisions everyday.”125  Perhaps Cynthia Herdrich disagreed, as the 
author does, with the characterization by the Court of the decision to deny her 
treatment as an “administrative decision” that simply went wrong.126  This particular 
“administrative decision” had disastrous consequences and cannot simply be 
explained away as a “mixed eligibility” decision.  To do so would rip whatever 
fabric remains of the medical trust between patient and doctor subsequent to the 
introduction of cost conscious HMOs. 
For now, suffice it to say that the Court found no way that the eligibility and 
treatment decisions in Cynthia Herdrich’s case could be “untangled from the 
physician’s judgments about reasonable medical treatment.”127  Doctor Pegram’s 
                                                                
118Id.  
119Id.  
120Id. at 226. 
121Id. at 227. 
122Pegram, 530 U.S. at 227. 
123Id. at 228-29. 
124Id. at 229. 
125Id.  
126Id.  
127Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229. 
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determination, as wrong as it was, made it possible for Carle to claim the “mixed 
eligibility” defense and avoid responsibility for the actions of one of its providers.128  
This amounts to a most convoluted legal rationale since virtually every decision 
rendered daily by HMO providers falls into this category.129  The practical effect of 
this ruling is to render HMOs virtually judgment proof as long as the “mixed 
eligibility” factor is retained in the treatment process analysis.130  This is hardly what 
Americans bargained for when managed care organizations burst onto the scene as 
the much heralded answer to medical inflation.131  How should a blatantly incorrect 
diagnosis be treated when the sum total of all medical decisions affect the physician's 
annual kickback payment?132  Does ERISA strip patients of all protection against 
HMO negligence, perhaps not in the “mixed eligibility” issue?133  These are 
questions that now lay open as a result of Pegram.  The Supreme Court has 
definitely provided the managed care industry with a shield that, when combined 
with a favorable preemption decision yet to come, will render HMOs more difficult 
to pursue in litigation.134 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The most contradictory portion of the Court’s rationale is the legalistic leap made 
regarding Congressional intent, “we think Congress did not intend Carle or any other 
HMO to be treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it makes mixed eligibility 
decisions acting through its physicians.”135  The Court continues, “We begin with 
doubt that Congress would ever have thought of a mixed eligibility decision as 
fiduciary in nature.”136  It is difficult to accord this speculation to be a fair reading of 
legislative history.  Court speculation is not to be substituted for true legislative 
intent, and yet here, there appears to be no difficulty in doing so.  Furthermore, the 
Court cites Lockheed v. Spink137 to support the proposition that Carle was free to 
establish the kickback scheme since its “decisions about the content of a plan are not 
themselves fiduciary acts.”138  Lockheed spoke to the issue of whether an employer 
had to adopt a plan or establish employee benefits at all.  This rationale has been 
improperly intertwined and compared with the decision-making power handed over 
by Carle to its providing physicians to increase pecuniary gain at the expense of 
patient care.  Mixed eligibility aside, this is not what underpinned the Lockheed 
                                                                
128Id. 
129Id.  
130Id.  
131Id.  
132See, e.g., Michiz, supra note 47. 
133Id.  
134Id.  
135Id.  
136Id.  
137517 U.S. 882 (1996). 
138Id. at 887.  
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holding.  There it simply was a question of plan establishment, and it did not have 
the employer-created conflict of interest issues present in Pegram. 
Then the Court turns to the common law fiduciary which is also a comparative 
stretch since the statute contains a fiduciary provision within.  Even if the Court is 
afforded a favorable interpretation with respect to the applicability of common law 
fiduciaries, its conclusions are compelling, “[T]hus, the common law trustee's most 
defining concern historically has been the payment of money in the interest of the 
beneficiary.”139  Is this also not the case with health plans that are governed by 
ERISA?140  Even if the Court believes that actions by Carle Company did not rise to 
a level sufficient to impose liability under this theory, the language of the opinion 
leaves the reader with the distinct impression that fiduciary law has no applicability 
to an HMO’s handling of an ESBP.141  But the Court states further that, “Mixed 
eligibility decisions by an HMO acting through its physicians have, however, only a 
limited resemblance to the usual business of traditional trustees.”142 
It is at this point that the Court pens the most controversial paragraph in the 
opinion: 
To be sure, the physicians (like regular trustees) draw on resources held 
for others and make decisions to distribute them in accordance with 
entitlements expressed in a written instrument (embodying terms of an 
ERISA plan).  It is also true that the objects of many traditional private 
and public trusts are ultimately the same as the ERISA plans that contract 
with HMOs.  Private trusts provide medical care to the poor; thousands of 
independent hospitals are privately held and publicly accountable trusts, 
and charitable foundations make grants to stimulate the provision of 
health services.143 
The foregoing preamble to the paragraph could just as easily be an introduction to a 
decision upholding Herdrich’s claim.144  What then, makes the difference?145  The 
Court continues: 
But beyond this point the resemblance rapidly wanes.  Traditional trustees 
administer a medical trust by paying out money to buy medical care, 
whereas physicians making mixed eligibility decisions consume the 
money as well.  Private trustees do not make treatment judgments, 
whereas treatment judgments are what physicians reaching mixed 
decisions do make, by definition.  Indeed, the physicians through whom 
HMOs act make just the sorts of decisions made by licensed medical 
practitioners millions of times every day, in every possible medical 
                                                                
139Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231. 
140Id.  
141Id.  
142Id. 
143Id. 
144Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231. 
145Id. at 233 n.11 (opining the death of the HMO if Herdrich were to prevail on her claim). 
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setting:  HMOs, fee-for-service proprietorships, public and private 
hospitals, military field hospitals, and so on.  The settings bear no more 
resemblance to trust departments than a decision to operate turns on the 
factors controlling the amount of a quarterly income distribution.146 
Although it is true that private trustees may not make mixed eligibility decisions, this 
conduct does not, as the Court suggests, differentiate HMO provider decisions from 
the common law trustee.147  They are both very much trustees, and the term “mixed 
eligibility” is a misnomer as the Court uses it in this opinion.148  A “mixed 
eligibility” choice is not a decision as to whether a patient needs operative care, it is 
a conscious decision to forego medical care that the provider believes is not 
essential, and therefore, justified in its denial.149  Further, this decision is reached 
with full knowledge that significant pecuniary benefit is accorded to the provider.150 
The Court would have us believe that “mixed eligibility” decisions are to be 
looked at from the view that medical practitioners can be trusted to do the right thing 
in the face of a plan that rewards them handsomely for denying care, specifically 
specialist services.151  Worse yet, the Court supports the notion that rationing of care 
is an absolute key component of managed care, otherwise it will not work.152  
Without a substantial remedy that undertreated patients can seek against these 
managed care organizations, a mockery is made of the very essence of common law 
negligence and malpractice causes of action. 
Further, the author is not so naive as to believe that the physicians of today, who 
are feeling the pinch of managed care as it changes the level of autonomy they once 
enjoyed, are as altruistic as the Court portrays them.153  But the Court's final 
                                                                
146Id. at 231-32. 
147Id. 
148Id. 
149Pegram, 530 U.S. at 232. 
150Id. 
151Id. at 234.  The Court stated:  “The fiduciary is, of course, obliged to act exclusively in 
the interest of the beneficiary, but this translates into no rule readily applicable to HMO 
decisions or those of any other variety of medical practice.”  Id.  According to this rationale 
ERISA does not apply to employer sponsored health benefit plans at all, thereby begging the 
question as to exactly how the Court views the statutory fiduciary provision.  Id. 
152Pegram, 530 U.S. at 233.  “Since the provision for profit is what makes the HMO a 
proprietary organization, her [Herdrich] remedy in effect, would be nothing less than 
elimination of the for-profit HMO.”  Id. The Court speculates as to the ultimate effect of a 
decision in favor of the patient in this case, “Recovery [according to Herdrich] would be 
warranted simply upon showing that the profit incentive to ration care would generally affect 
mixed decisions, in derogation of the fiduciary standard to act solely in the interest of the 
patient without possibility of conflict.”  Id. at 232-33. 
153Id. at 233.  Of equal concern to the Court was not just the immediate outcome of 
Herdrich’s remedy request but speculation as to whether the managed care business would 
survive such a victory.  “Her remedy might entail even more than that, although we are in no 
position to tell whether and to what extent nonprofit HMO schemes would ultimately survive 
the recognition of Herdrich’s theory.”  Id.  The Court’s mere speculation on this point is 
totally unwarranted, unnecessary to the decision at hand and makes clear its predisposition to 
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pronouncement is one that can be readily accepted, “Thus, it is at least questionable 
whether Congress would have had mixed eligibility decisions in mind when it 
provided that decisions administering a plan were fiduciary in nature.”154  This 
conclusion is critical to buttressing the weak rationale afforded by Pegram v. 
Herdrich, but then, the Court ought not be in the business of fabricating legislative 
histories.155  Finally, the Court expresses the view that Congress is the correct forum 
for a resolution to this interpretative problem.156  The reticence with which this 
argument is espoused is astounding since the Court has never seen fit to curtail its 
interpretative powers over ERISA in the past.157  What remains at the end of Pegram 
is a clarion call for Congress to pass legislation that clearly delineates the 
applicability of ERISA to pensions and deferred compensation, or in the alternative, 
clearly prohibiting its application to employer sponsored health care plans under 
                                                          
support the managed care industry by offering support to its financial viability.  This is not the 
job of the Court but serves better to provide HMOs with exactly the type of “I told you so” 
justification that has proliferated the industry for the past decade.  
154Pegram, 530 U.S. at 232. 
155Id. at 236.  One primary concern the Court has is the creation and promotion of a 
federal fiduciary malpractice claim should Herdrich prevail:  “[w]hat would be gained by 
opening the federal courthouse doors for a fiduciary malpractice claim, save for possibly 
random fortuities such as more favorable scheduling, or the ancillary opportunity to seek 
attorney's fees.”  Id. at 237. 
156Id. at 233.  The Court relies exclusively on the right of Congress to promote and govern 
the practices of HMOs.  Id. (citing Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 
914, 42 U.S.C. § 300e et. seq., as amended by, 110 Stat. 1976 (1994 ed., Supp. III)). 
157See Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S. 432 (The “Exclusive Benefit” rule contained in 
ERISA does not preclude a decision by the plan sponsor to confer benefits on others, nor does 
it prevent the sponsor from promoting business related interests not related to current pension 
benefits.  The Supreme Court also held that plan benefits could be enhanced for current 
employees without violation of this rule.).  See generally J. KARNS, Deferred Compensation 
Planning, The ‘Exclusive Benefit’ Rule, and The Hughes Aircraft Case: Has the Employer 
Benefit Restriction Been Altered With Respect to ERISA Qualified Pension Plans?, 33 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 507 (2000).  See also supra note 44. 
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ERISA.158  This is the reason that the statute was passed, and it should not be used by 
managed care organizations to conveniently avoid malpractice liability.159 
But the real devastation of the Pegram decision rests in the judicially sanctioned 
shield placed around the healthcare industry, and the damage that it will have in 
denying treatment resulting in life and death consequences.  The only hope that 
consumer patients have at present is the case of Pappas v. Asbell,160 decided by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court prior to the February 12, 2000, decision in Pegram v. 
Herdrich.161  In Pappas, the Pennsylvania High Court followed structured case 
precedent in holding that HMOs were liable to patients under the ERISA statute.  
Interestingly, in that case the United States Department of Labor [hereinafter 
“USDOL”] filed an initial amicus brief that supported the HMO position.162  
Following remand by the United States Supreme Court to reconsider the decision in 
light of Pegram, the USDOL has filed a second brief repudiating the position it took 
in the previous pleading.163  Proponents of HMOs spell doom if the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court is persuaded by the reversal in positions, even if it is a change by an 
executive agency rather than a higher court. 
One commentator, a member of the bar who represents HMOs, went so far as to 
say that the revised USDOL position would threaten HMOs with infinite liability:  
                                                                
158Pegram, 530 U.S. at 233.  If the Supreme Court selectively adopts a broad interpretation 
of ERISA when convenient then the following dicta in Pegram has no basis: 
Indeed, when Congress took up the subject of fiduciary responsibility under ERISA, it 
concentrated on fiduciaries' financial decisions, focusing on pension plans, the 
difficulty many retirees faced in getting the payments they expected, and the financial 
mismanagement that had too often deprived employees of their benefits.  Its focus was 
far from the subject of Herdrich's claim.  Our doubt that Congress intended the 
category of fiduciary administrative functions to encompass the mixed determinations 
at issue here hardens into conviction when we consider the consequences that would 
follow from Herdrich’s contrary view.  
Id. at 232 (citations omitted).  See also supra note 65. 
This judicial observation is emboldened by the comment that “[T]he mischief of 
Herdrich's position . . . ,” would portend serious consequences for federal jurisdictional 
purposes.  Pegram, 530 U.S. at 236.  
159Id. at 235-36.  Perhaps the most telling aspect of the Court’s bias in favor of HMOs is 
the less than slightly veiled prognostication of the dangers to follow a Herdrich victory.  
Again, the federal fiduciary malpractice claim has the justices concerned more about judicial 
workload than uncorroborated legislative history.  (“[W]e know that Congress had no such 
haphazard boons in prospect when it defined the ERISA fiduciary, nor such a risk to the 
efficiency of federal courts as a new fiduciary-malpractice jurisdiction would pose in 
welcoming such unheard-of fiduciary litigation.”  Id. at 237.)  For the final time, Justice 
Souter demonstrates histrionically exactly what Congress intended in the ERISA fiduciary 
provision and the opinion that it would lead to another federal jurisdiction basis.  These 
conclusions are not warranted but do serve to neatly contain the Herdrich claim before it is 
permitted to open the way for more litigation against the managed care industry.  Or does it?  
See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. 
160724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), cert. granted, vacated by 530 U.S. 1241 (2000). 
161530 U.S. 211. 
162Deirdre Davidson, HMOs Face Attacks on Two Fronts, NAT’L L.J. at B1, B3.  
163Id. 
22 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 15:1 
“HMOs are going to be sued for everything they do and everything they don’t do.  
What the Department of Labor opinion would do, if adopted by the court, is 
undermine every single element of managed care.”164  In the interest of equity and 
justice this opinion is barely defensible as it will place an impenetrable barricade 
around managed care organizations.  Patient consumers would like to settle for 
HMOs being liable for at least something rather than nothing, since clearly, the 
industry oriented bar is not looking to protect the fate of the citizenry.  As for HMO 
liability under ERISA, the final word has not been formulated, yet alone articulated 
in law and policy.  It is time for Congress to erase the legalese quagmire of “mixed 
eligibility versus treatment” decisions created by the Court and to stop “ERISA 
creep” from destroying every conceivable legal recourse open to patients injured as a 
result of corporate business judgment rather than professional and ethical standards 
left to practicing providers.  The paycheck of a providing physician ought not depend 
on whether minimal and questionable treatment decisions are made.  Given the 
Supreme Court’s position as to HMO status as a fiduciary under ERISA, only with 
the swift and decisive intervention of Congress can the provision of healthcare in the 
United States retain its standing as a national priority and not just a business.  
However, this will not happen without an immediate recognition of the fact that 
“managed care” is not synonymous with “rationed care.”165 
 
                                                                
164Id. 
165The Court openly sanctions the proposition that rationing care and the basic premise 
behind an HMO’s approach to managed care via annual kickback payments are compatible 
and to be expected despite possible malpractice negligence: 
Since inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any HMO scheme, and 
rationing necessarily raises some risks while reducing others (ruptured appendixes are 
more likely; unnecessary appendectomies are less so), any legal principle purporting 
to draw a line between good and bad HMOs would embody, in effect a judgment 
about socially acceptable medical risk.   
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 221. 
Courts engage in decision-making that has immense social implications on a regular basis.  
Even ERISA has been so interpreted in the past, so why the espoused denial of the right to do 
so in this case?  See supra note 43.  In addition, state legislatures are evidencing a willingness 
to enter this contentious area.  North Carolina has enacted a law that would severely limit, if 
not eliminate, the cost containment payments at issue in Pegram.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-
265 (2001). 
